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  Sniff and Search Border  Militar ization 
Yessenia Renee Medrano-Vossler∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF THE BORDER PATROL UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE 100-MILE BORDER ZONE RULE 
While driving on the Tohono O’odham Indian Reservation in Arizona, 50 
miles north of the US-Mexico border, Ms. Ernestine Josemaria, a Tohono 
O’odham member and US citizen, was stopped by Border Patrol.1 An agent 
approached the passenger side of her vehicle and began yelling at Ms. 
Josemaria, demanding her identification and reason for speeding, even 
though Ms. Josemaria had not been speeding.2 After Ms. Josemaria asked 
whether the Tribal Police should be involved, the agent yelled and 
demanded that Ms. Josemaria get out of the vehicle.3 After she refused, the 
agent accused Ms. Josemaria of being a “known smuggler” and called for 
back up.4 Four more agents arrived; one unbuckled her seat belt, and the 
agents pulled at her arms and legs until Ms. Josemaria exited the vehicle.5 
The agents searched Ms. Josemaria’s truck despite her objections.6 Then, 
the agents called for a drug-dog and made Ms. Josemaria wait for 
                                                                                                       
∗   Thank you to the many inspiring, thoughtful, and supportive people who helped me 
write and edit this article, especially Becky Fish, James Lyall, Anna Roberts, Steven 
Bender, and the  2014–15 and 2015–16 Seattle Journal for Social Justice staff and 
editorial board. This article is dedicated to all those affected by and resisting border 
militarization. In solidarity! 
1 Letter from James Lyall, Staff Att’y, AM. C.L. UNION, to Charles K. Edwards, Deputy 
Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 4 (Oct. 9, 2013), 
http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ACLU%20AZ%20Complaint%20re
%20CBP%20Roving%20Patrols%20Oct%209%202013.pdf [hereinafter Letter 1 from 
James Lyall]. 
2    Id. at 5. 
3    Id. 
4    Id. 
5    Id. 
6   Id. 
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approximately one hour for the drug-dog to arrive.7 Neither the agents nor 
the drug-dog found any contraband.8 Ms. Josemaria’s testimony is one of 
many stories where the Border Patrol’s use of a drug-dog unlawfully 
prolonged an apparent suspicionless stop, violating Ms. Josemaria’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.9 
The emphasis of often unsympathetic facts in Fourth Amendment cases 
that we hear about rather than the unlawful government conduct that led to 
the stop or search, often rationalizes the many court decisions chipping 
away at the protections under the Fourth Amendment of the US 
Constitution.10 In border communities,11 despite sympathetic facts, local law 
                                                                                                       
7   Id. Border Patrol agents use drug-dogs at immigration checkpoints to detect concealed 
humans, narcotics, and other contraband. Canine Program, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/canine-program (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
8 Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1, at 5. 
9 See generally Record of Abuse, AM. C.L. UNION 2–3 (Oct. 2015), 
http://www.acluaz.org/Record_of_Abuse (documenting numerous general complaints 
against Customs and Border Protection along the Arizona-Mexico border including 
several false drug-dog alerts. These complaints do not appear to have resulted in any 
disciplinary action against the agency. This report was compiled from information 
received through a Freedom of Information Act filed by the ACLU in April 2014) 
[hereinafter Record of Abuse].  
10 For example, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Florida v. Riley noted that “‘[i]t is a fair 
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in 
controversies involving not very nice people,’ and nowhere is this observation more apt 
than in the area of the Fourth Amendment, whose words have necessarily been given 
meaning largely through decisions suppressing evidence of criminal activity.” Florida v. 
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 463–64 (1989) (Brennan J., dissent) (quoting United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter J., dissent)). 
11   In this article, “border communities” refers to the land and people within the Border 
Patrol’s jurisdiction as defined by US federal laws and regulations. That is, the 100-mile 
border zone along the perimeter of the United States, Puerto Rico, Hawai‘i, and Alaska. 
Additionally, when I refer to the border, I am referring to the commonly known 
international border lines that were arbitrarily constructed years ago as a way to mark 
territorial expansion, designed to exclude indigenous populations and future immigrants. 
See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1952) (providing the border patrol with the 
authority to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles within a “reasonable distance” of 
the border, and private property except for homes within twenty-five miles of the border); 
see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a)(2) (2014) (defining “reasonable distance” of the border as 
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enforcement and the US Border Patrol’s (“Border Patrol”) ability to trample 
individuals’ (citizens’ and non-citizens’) civil rights with impunity is ever 
expanding. 12 
In the summer of 2014, I interned in my hometown of Tucson, Arizona, 
at a non-profit legal organization focusing on civil rights in the border 
region. One of my tasks was conducting intake with individuals whose 
rights had been violated by the Border Patrol, local law enforcement, or 
both. One of the numerous types of abuses I heard of was prolonged 
detention at immigration checkpoints due to the use of drug-dogs. 
Individuals I spoke with reported that, similar to Ms. Josemaria’s 
experience, when passing through immigration checkpoints or being 
stopped by Border Patrol agents, they were not usually asked about their 
immigration status (the primary purpose of immigration checkpoints)13 and 
instead were detained, searched, and harassed due to alleged drug-dog 
“alerts.”  
Documentation of drug-dog alerts is limited due to lack of reporting, 
from the Border Patrol as well as border residents and travelers. 14 
                                                                                                       
“100 air miles from any external boundary”); The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border 
Zone, AM. C.L. UNION, www.aclu.org/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2016); Record of Abuse, supra note 9. 
12 The US Border Patrol is “the mobile, uniformed law enforcement arm of U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection within the Department of Homeland Security responsible 
for securing U.S. borders[.]”Along U.S. Borders, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders (last visited Mar. 5, 
2016).  
13 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559–62 (1976). 
14 For example, only after filing a FOIA request in 2014 and suing CBP was the ACLU 
able to retrieve over one hundred complaints against the Border Patrol that had never 
been shared with the public. Additionally, the information received from that FOIA 
request is incomplete and only documents two checkpoints in Arizona. “For example, 
from Fiscal Year 2012 through Fiscal Year 2013, DHS oversight agencies reported just 
three complaints involving alleged Fourth Amendment violations, nationwide. Yet 
government records produced to the ACLU reveal that at least 81 such complaints 
originated in Tucson and Yuma Sectors alone during the same period (with at least 38 
more through just part of FY 2014).” See Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2.  
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Nonetheless, suspicionless detention and searches of border travelers and 
residents by law enforcement and drug-dogs is common, and often leads to 
traumatic and invasive experiences and destruction of property with no 
accountability on the part of the Border Patrol.15 Furthermore, search and 
seizure standards at or near the border (and in general) are at times unclear, 
both to the general public and to the Border Patrol.16 This means many 
individuals are unaware of their rights when traveling through the border 
zone, and the Border Patrol is free to perpetuate lawless enforcement 
tactics. 
The Border Patrol’s primary goal at interior immigration checkpoints has 
become narcotics enforcement—a general law enforcement priority outside 
of the Border Patrol’s expertise and one explicitly prohibited by the 
Supreme Court 17 —rather than immigration enforcement. 18  This priority 
                                                                                                       
15 See Letter from James Lyall, Staff Att’y, AM. C.L. UNION, to Charles K. Edwards, 
Deputy Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 4 (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ACLU%20AZ%20Complaint%20re
%20CBP%20Checkpoints%20%202014%2001%2015.pdf [hereinafter Letter 2 from 
James Lyall] (citing twelve incidents where US citizens indicated that they were searched 
due to a drug-dog’s false alert and held for varying lengths of time).  
16 For example, different immigration stops require different levels of suspicion, and the 
evolving Fourth Amendment standards make the law ambiguous and inaccessible to 
many border residents and travelers. Additionally, reports indicate that Border Patrol tells 
drivers and passengers that the Border Patrol does not need any suspicion to stop or 
search a vehicle, which deters individuals from asserting their rights in the face of 
unlawful law enforcement conduct. The Border Patrol operates with very little oversight, 
and the laws regarding reasonable or unreasonable Border Patrol tactics are constantly 
changing among the circuits and subject to agreements with local law enforcement. 
17  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000). 
18 In discussing the holding in United State v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), 
Circuit Judge Kozinski’s dissent in United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312 (1993), went on 
to say that these immigration checkpoints have also yielded a high interdiction of drugs, 
pointing to several suppression cases since 1992 stemming from border checkpoints. 
While noting that this coincidence may be “an accident,” Judge Kozinski noted that “it 
may be much more: There’s reason to suspect the agents working these checkpoints are 
looking for more than [undocumented immigrants]. If that is true, it subverts the rationale 
of Martinez-Fuerte and turns a legitimate administrative search into a massive violation 
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shift has resulted in a rash of civil rights violations around the US border, 
including unlawful searches and seizures stemming from misuse of drug-
dogs and drug-dog error.19 Greater transparency and oversight of the Border 
Patrol’s drugs-dogs and reconsideration of the use of drug-dogs in 
uncontrolled settings like checkpoints, where their accuracy and reliability 
is greatly diminished, is needed.20 Removing drug-dogs from the 100-mile 
border zone will help reduce the unchecked civil rights violations by the 
Border Patrol.21 
A. Drug-Dogs Should Not Be Allowed at Interior Immigration Checkpoints 
because they Empower the Border Patrol to Overstep their Lawful Purpose 
Available documented border civil rights violations often involve the 
Border Patrol’s use of drug-dogs, and their elimination could help to curb 
those violations. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has pointed 
out that interior immigration checkpoints and Border Patrol operations 
allow Border Patrol agents excessive power over border residents and 
travelers with little oversight or accountability.22 Additionally, drug-dogs 
can be unreliable due to dog and/or handler error or bias, leads to unlawful 
detentions. 23  Lastly, drug-dog searches lead to property damage, 
                                                                                                       
of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
19 See generally Customs and Border Protection’s 100-Mile Rule, AM. C.L. UNION 2 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/13_08_01_aclu_100_mile_cbp_zone_final.
pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2016) (providing summaries of civil rights violations committed 
nationally at both northern and southern borders).  
20 See Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2–3.   
21 See, e.g., id. at n.50, n.52 (citing support for the inaccuracy of drug-dogs). For 
example, when a drug-dog inaccurately alerts, either because of drug-dog error or handler 
misconduct, a border patrol agent automatically has probable cause to search the 
individual’s vehicle, thus unconstitutionally prolonging the vehicle stop.    
22 See generally Letter 2 from James Lyall, supra note 15, at 4 (documenting twelve 
instances of unlawful conduct at border checkpoints and requesting immediate review 
and investigation by the Department of Homeland Security). 
23 Id. at 5–8, 10–11, 13–16. 
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intimidation, and traumatizing experiences.24 Thus, removal of drug-dogs 
from interior border checkpoints could limit prolonged seizures and 
baseless searches resulting in an overall decrease in abuses at the border. 
While ultimately Border Patrol’s authority should be scaled back 
drastically, this article focuses on challenging the use of drug-dogs at 
immigration checkpoints within the 100-mile border zone as a step towards 
decreasing civil rights violations.  
B. Limited Civil Rights Based on Proximity to International Borders Should 
be a Cause for National Concern and Action 
A drug-dog alert in both the local law enforcement and the border 
enforcement contexts is sufficient to establish the probable cause needed to 
search a vehicle without a warrant or the driver’s consent.25 While internal 
immigration checkpoints (immigration checkpoints existing within the 
interior of the United States) are lawful for immigration enforcement 
purposes,26 in practice, that purpose is often a pretext for the checkpoint’s 
secondary focus on drug regulation and general law enforcement—resulting 
in frequent civil rights violations.27 
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “one of the world’s largest 
law enforcement organizations,”28 includes as a component agency the US 
Border Patrol. 29  CBP’s primary and secondary purposes are “terrorist 
detection and apprehension” and “detection and seizure of controlled 
                                                                                                       
24 Id. at 10–11.  
25 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
26 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559–62. (1976). 
27 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 31, 47–48 (2000); see also Record of Abuse, 
supra note 9, at 11, n. 50, n. 52.  
28 About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, http://www.cbp.gov/about (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
29 Along U.S. Borders, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, http://www.cbp.gov/border-
security/along-us-borders (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
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substances,” 30 respectively. While its purposes remain largely undefined, its 
secondary purpose delegates wide discretion to the Border Patrol to engage 
in general law enforcement power rather than its primary purpose of 
immigration enforcement and apprehension.31 
Several sets of data illustrate how the Border Patrol has taken advantage 
of its general law enforcement power. For example, in the ACLU’s report, 
“Record of Abuse,” the ACLU indicates that 2013 CBP arrest statistics 
demonstrate that, 
Tucson Sector checkpoint apprehensions accounted for only 0.67 
percent of the sector’s total apprehensions. In calendar year 2013, 
nine out of 23 Tucson sector checkpoints produced zero arrests of 
‘deportable subjects.’ The same year, Yuma Sector checkpoint 
arrests of U.S. citizens exceeded those of non-citizens by a factor 
of nearly eight[.] One checkpoint in Yuma Sector, located 75 miles 
from the border, reported only one non-citizen apprehension in 
three years, while producing multiple civil rights complaints 
during the same period.32 
Similarly, apprehension and narcotics seizure data available on CBP’s 
website indicates that apprehensions in the Border Sectors33 dramatically 
                                                                                                       
30 Canine Program, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, http://www.cbp.gov/border-
security/along-us-borders/canine-program (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
31 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559–62. 
32 Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 3; see also Andrew Becker, Four of Five Border 
Patrol Drug Busts Involve U.S. Citizens, Records Show, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE 
REPORTING (Mar. 26, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports/four-five-border-patrol-drug-
busts-involve-us-citizens-records-show-4312 (emphasis added). 
33 “Sector” refers to regions the Border Patrol has divided up for its enforcement 
activities. There are twenty sectors nationwide. The Southwest Border Sectors include 
nine cities along the southwest—Big Bend (formerly Marfa), Del Rio, El Centro, El Paso, 
Laredo, Rio Grande Valley (formerly McAllen), San Diego, Tucson, and Yuma. The 
Southwest Border Sectors has consistently been the most staffed region, reporting 18,156 
agents in the region in fiscal year 2014, compared to the Northern Border Sectors (Blaine, 
Buffalo, Detroit, Grand Forks, Havre, Houlton, Spokane, and Swanton) reporting 2,093 
agents, and the Coastal Border Sectors (Miami, New Orleans, and Ramey) reporting 215 
agents. While the number has fluctuated drastically over the past decade, the Southwest 
Border Sectors has also consistently reported the highest number of apprehensions and 
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decreased from fiscal year 2005 (1,089,092 reported apprehensions) 
through fiscal year 2011 (340,252 reported apprehensions).34 Meanwhile, in 
its 2012 and 2013 “Summar[ies] of Performance and Financial 
Information,” CBP reported that the amount of “illegal narcotics seized” has 
remained at “2.8 million pounds.”35 This number has shifted (this number is 
up 0.1 million pounds from 2010 but down 0.3 from 2011).36 Available data 
supports the notion that regardless of migration patterns, the Border Patrol’s 
priorities at immigration checkpoints prioritize narcotics regulation. 
Below is an overview of the relevant Fourth Amendment law and the 
source and authority of the 100-mile border zone rule, sometimes referred 
                                                                                                       
drug seizures. See Sector Profile-Fiscal Year 2014, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USBP%20Stats%20FY2014%20sector
%20profile.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).  
34  Southwest Border Sectors: Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Fiscal Year, U. S. 
BORDER PATROL, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Fiscal%
20Year%20Apprehension%20Statistics%201960-2013.pdf  (last visited Nov. 3, 2014);  
Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Month, U. S. BORDER PATROL, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20Apps%2
0by%20Sector%20and%20Area%2C%20FY2000-FY2014_0.pdf (last visited April 19, 
2015) (reporting CBP apprehension statistics from fiscal years 1960 through 2013. In 
2006, CBP reported 1,071,972 apprehensions, whereas in 2013, 414,397 were reported 
along the Southwest. While apprehensions reportedly began increasing again in 2012, the 
increase has been slower, reporting 486,651 total apprehensions across the sectors in 
fiscal year 2014).   




%20FINAL%20%28panels%29%20%20%20.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).   
36  This number “represents narcotics held by [Customs and Border Protection] until 
disposal or destruction,” and includes all border checkpoints. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PATROL, 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FY%202013%20Final%20PAR_0.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2016); see also 
Summary of Performance and Financial Information, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PATROL, http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/summary_2010_3.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2016). 
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to as the “Constitution-Free Zone” due to the culture of impunity.37 This 
section provides an overview of different types of immigration checkpoints 
and the reasoning and authority behind those checkpoints. The CBP Canine 
Program and its purported effectiveness in contributing to border security in 
general, an overview of drug-dog related abuses within the 100-mile border 
zone as documented by the ACLU’s Border Litigation Project is also 
summarized below, and arguments and policies for and against the use of 
drug-dogs at interior checkpoints are summarized below. Lastly, this article 
proposes ways in which eliminating drug-dogs from interior checkpoints 
would help limit Fourth Amendment search and seizure violations in border 
communities. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE 100-MILE BORDER ZONE: NOT A 
“CONSTITUTION FREE ZONE” 
While the federal government and case law have severely limited our 
civil rights depending on proximity to the US borders,38 these limitations do 
not justify the culture of impunity that the Border Patrol operates under. 
This section provides an overview of the Fourth Amendment law and the 
100-mile border zone rule, and explanations of how these laws diminish our 
civil rights. It also provides a summary of common types of immigration 
checkpoints and other interior operations within the 100-mile border zone 
including roving patrol stops, and temporary and fixed checkpoints, and 
how drug-dogs are used at immigration checkpoints. 
                                                                                                       
37 The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, AM. C.L. UNION, 
www.aclu.org/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
38 For example, see U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion 
emphasized that the Court’s decision to permit suspicionless immigration checkpoint 
stops along the border served to continue the “evisceration of the Fourth Amendment 
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures[,]” and “virtually emptie[d] the 
Amendment of its reasonableness requirement[.]” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 567–68 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405, 408 (2005) (pointing to the lack of privacy right in possessing unlawful substances). 
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A. There is No Drug Exception in the Fourth Amendment’s Protection 
Against Unlawful Searches and Seizures39 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures. 40  A 
seizure incudes even a brief detention or stop by a government official.41 In 
assessing the “reasonableness of the seizure,” the court balances “the public 
interest [against] the individual’s right to personal security free from 
arbitrary interference by law officers.” 42  For example, in City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme Court made it clear that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited against suspicionless checkpoints to interdict 
drugs.43 Conversely, the Court has held that the public interest in deterring 
unlawful immigration justifies the operation of suspicionless immigration 
checkpoints within the 100-mile border zone.44 
The Fourth Amendment also protects against unreasonable searches by 
requiring a warrant or consent in most cases.45 Courts have maintained that 
at a minimum, a search requires consent or probable cause, where 
                                                                                                       
39 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Association, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1980) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
40 The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
41 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (citing Davis v. 
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969)).  
42 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21). 
43 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 31, 47–48 (2000). 
44 See generally United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559–60 (1976) 
(describing why suspicionless routing immigration checkpoints are less intrusive to the 
public than roving patrol stops); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878–80 (clarifying that the 
reasonableness of Fourth Amendment seizures is measured by the “balance between the 
public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary 
interference by law enforcement”); United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 431 
(5th Cir. 2001) (stating that “checkpoints with the primary purpose of identifying 
[undocumented] immigrants are constitutional, and checkpoints with the primary purpose 
of interdicting illegal drugs are not”).  
45 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973).  
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“reasonably trustworthy” facts and circumstances known to law 
enforcement are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that “an 
offense has been or is being committed.” 46  Furthermore, suspiconless 
Border Patrol checkpoint stops in the 100-mile border zone are not 
supposed to permit free range to law enforcement to conduct searches; at 
minimum, probable cause must exist for an interior search. 47 Thus, while 
the Border Patrol can set up checkpoints to stop drivers in the border region 
without any level of suspicion, the scope of inquiry is limited to brief 
questioning for immigration purposes absent suspicion. 48  Border Patrol 
agents often exceed this scope. 
B. The 100-mile Border Zone Rule Grants too Much Authority to the Border 
Patrol and Stems from Outdated Regulations 
The boundaries of the 100-mile border zone derive from 8 U.S.C. §1357 
(powers of immigration officers and employees). 49 8 U.S.C. §1357 was 
adopted by the US Department of Justice in 1953, during a time when less 
than 1,100 Border Patrol agents patrolled our borders.50 In 1957, the US 
Government defined 8 U.S.C. §1357(a)(3)’s “reasonable distance” 
language as “100 air miles from any external boundary of the United 
States.”51 In his majority opinion in Alameida-Sanchez v. United States in 
1973, Justice Stewart pointed out that no justification for such a broad 
search power exists other than the “reasonable distance” language of the 
                                                                                                       
46 See Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States 267 
U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).  
47 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 269 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 
(1925). 
48 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 31, 47–48 (2000); Machuca-Barrera, 261 
F.3d at 431 (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41). 
49 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2006)). 
50 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357 (1952); The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone AM. C.L. 
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2016).  
51 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a)(2) (2014) (emphasis added). 
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statute.52 Revisiting the scope of this statute is a necessity now more than 
ever because today, over 21,000 Border Patrol agents patrol our borders 
nationwide, 53  and two-thirds of the United State’s population 
(approximately 200 million people) reside within the Border Patrol’s 100-
mile jurisdiction.54 Despite the dramatic increase in militarization of the 
border, the 100-mile border zone regulation has remained static, while case 
law and US policy continue to expand the authority of the Border Patrol and 
limit civil rights within border communities.55 
C. Know Your Rights: An Overview of Lawful Searches and Seizures within 
the 100-Mile Border Zone 
While all persons entering the United States, including US citizens, are 
subject to examination and search by CBP officers, this article focuses on 
checkpoints existing within the 100-mile border zone, not including 
international ports of entry. 56  However, the authority permitting routine 
border searches at international borders extends to temporary or fixed 
immigration checkpoints within the interior of the United States.57 
This section explains the legal basis for the following Border Patrol 
operations—checkpoints, temporary checkpoints, roving patrol stops—and 
the laws around drug-dogs at checkpoints. This section concludes by 
providing additional examples of how courts have functioned to erase the 
restrictions on operating checkpoints for general law enforcement purposes. 
                                                                                                       
52 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S., 413 at 268 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2006)) (emphasis 
added). 
53 The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, AM. C.L. UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2016).  
54 Id.  
55 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1952) & 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a)(2) (2014). 
56 8 U.S.C. §1357(c) (1952). 
57 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272–73. 
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1. Permanent/Temporary Internal Immigration Checkpoints 
Permanent and temporary internal immigration checkpoints are structures 
along roadways within the 100-mile border zone. 58  These checkpoints 
derive their authority from the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte,59 which held that routine “stops for brief questioning” at 
immigration checkpoints are justified under the Fourth Amendment, 
regardless of individualized suspicion. 60  The Court in Martinez-Fuerte 
noted that “one’s expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in 
its operation are significantly different from the traditional expectation of 
privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”61 The Ninth Circuit has upheld the 
use of temporary checkpoints because of (1) the checkpoint’s primary 
purpose of immigration enforcement; (2) the lack of officer discretion in the 
placement and operation of the checkpoint; (3) the “checkpoint’s visibility, 
appearance, and the presence of numerous [officers] in uniform;” and (4) 
the minimal intrusion of the stop.62 
Some permanent and temporary checkpoints also have the capacity to 
refer vehicles to secondary inspection and Border Patrol agents may do so 
                                                                                                       
58 While sometimes referred to the “functional equivalent” of international border 
checkpoints, this title is misleading because there are distinct legal differences between 
the two types of checkpoints, including the fact that individual rights are less restricted at 
internal permanent checkpoints. For example, at international border checkpoints, 
customs officials are authorized to conduct warrantless searches of individuals if the 
official has reasonable cause to suspect the individual should not be admitted into the 
United States, whereas Border Patrol agents are required to obtain consent or probable 
cause to justify detention exceeding the routine questioning at permanent and temporary 
interior immigration checkpoints. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c)(2012); see also United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976).   
59  428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
60 Id. at 566. The Court reasoned that the stops were less invasive than roving patrol 
seizures (discussed below), the impact on traffic was minimal (for example, due to the 
location and structure of the checkpoint, motorists are less likely to be taken by surprise), 
and the operation of the checkpoints “involve less discretionary enforcement activity” 
decreasing the potential for abuse by inspecting officers. Id. at 559. 
61 Id. at 561. 
62 United States v. Hernandez, 739 F.2d 484, 487 (9th Cir.1984). 
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based on “less than reasonable suspicion.” 63  According to the Court in 
Martinez-Fuerte, referral to secondary inspection is justified even if “made 
largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry[.]” 64  Similar to the 
justification behind permanent or temporary checkpoints, the Court 
reasoned that referral to secondary inspection was not overly stigmatizing 
or intrusive, as alleged by the defendant, if the sole purpose was consistent 
with conducting brief questioning regarding immigration status.65 Consent 
or probable cause is required in order to justify any detention beyond the 
routine immigration stop or search.66 
According to the ACLU, the last time the Border Patrol disclosed 
immigration checkpoint information was in fiscal year 2008, where they 
reported operating 128 checkpoints nationwide.67 That number has likely 
increased, as The Arizona Republic reported that CBP operated 
approximately 170 checkpoints nationwide in February 2014.68 While CBP 
has reportedly refused to specify the location and number of operating 
immigration checkpoints, based on research conducted by The Arizona 
Republic, the Border Patrol likely has the ability to operate up to 200 
checkpoints.69 
                                                                                                       
63 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563. 
64 See id. at 563–67 (stating that “even if it be assumed that [secondary] referrals are 
made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, [the Court] perceive[d] no 
constitutional violation”). 
65 Id. at 560. 
66 Id. at 567.  
67  U.S. BORDER PATROL INTERIOR CHECKPOINTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, 
AM. C.L. UNION BORDER LITIGATION PROJECT 1 (Nov. 2014), 
https://www.aclusandiego.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Border-Patrol-Checkpoint-
FAQs.pdf.  
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2. Roving Patrol Stops 
Unlike temporary or permanent immigration checkpoints that allow stops 
of motorists without any level of suspicion, Border Patrol agents must have 
at least reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains individuals who 
could potentially be in the United States without lawful status in order to 
conduct a roving patrol stop.70 Furthermore, absent consent or probable 
cause, the scope of the roving patrol stop must be limited to inquiry about 
the citizenship and immigration status of the driver and passengers, and to 
an explanation of “suspicious circumstances”;71 no suspiconless search is 
permitted. 
3. The Function of Drug-Dogs at Immigration Checkpoints 
Drug-dogs are permitted at stops lawful at their inception as long as their 
use does not extend the stop beyond its permitted scope or absent additional 
suspicion. 72  In a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, the court 
                                                                                                       
70   In Terry v. Ohio, a reasonable suspicion was formed if the officer could “‘point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant’ a belief that his safety or that of others is in danger.” Similar to 
a Terry stop, the roving patrol “stop and inquiry must be ‘reasonably related in scope’” 
to the Border Patrol’s original reason for the stop. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 880–82 (1975) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). The Court 
articulated the following factors to support a stop based on reasonable suspicion: “(1) 
characteristics of the area in which [Border Patrol agents] encountered the vehicle; (2) its 
proximity to the border; (3) the usual patterns of traffic on the particular road; (4) 
previous experience with alien traffic; (5) information about recent illegal border 
crossings in the area; (6) the driver’s behavior; (7) aspects of the vehicle itself; and (8) 
the characteristic appearance of persons who live in Mexico, relying on such factors as 
the mode of dress and haircut.” Id. at 885. However, in United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held generally that 
“Hispanic appearance” is not an “appropriate factor.” 
71 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881–82.  
72   See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015) (holding that a traffic 
stop prolonged for seven to eight minutes to allow a drug-dog to walk around the vehicle 
was unconstitutional); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); see also 
United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2001). The court in that case 
clarified that “while a drug-dog sniff is not a search, it is beyond the justifying scope of 
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vacated a conviction due to the invalidity of a drug-dog search and 
remanded to the district court to determine whether the “prosecutors [could] 
establish the reliability of the trained canine[.]”73 In that case, the defendant 
alleged that the agent misguided the dog.74 Poorly trained handlers can also 
be the source of drug-dog inaccuracies.75 
Nevertheless, seizures extended “beyond the time reasonably required to 
complete” the original stop76 are not uncommon in border regions. In some 
instances, like that of Ms. Josemaria’s,77 the act of retrieving the drug-dog 
to conduct the routine sniff (the process of walking the dog around the 
vehicle) is not supported by the requisite suspicion, or the drug-dog “alert” 
itself is tainted.78  Drug-dogs are used at Border Patrol checkpoints and 
during roving patrol stops, and often unlawfully prolong the detentions, and 
justify the conditions for Border Patrol agents to conduct an unlawful 
search. 79 In the process, liberty, privacy, and property rights of individuals’ 
subject to these searches are violated. 
                                                                                                       
an immigration stop. Thus, Border Patrol agents may only conduct a drug-dog sniff if it 
does not lengthen the stop or if they obtain consent.” Id. at 432 n.21.  




75 Mark Derr, With Dog Detectives, Mistakes Can Happen, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/24/science/with-dog-detectives-mistakes-can-
happen.html.  
76   Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 
(1984)). 
77   Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1, at  4. 
78   These scenarios are not unheard of among communities militarized by law 
enforcement. For example, in Jay-Z’s rap single 99 Problems, released while Caballes, 
was pending before the Supreme Court, Jay-Z describes a scenario in which he is racially 
profiled and pulled over by a police officer, and after Jay-Z declines to provide consent 
for a search of his vehicle, the officer responds, “We’ll see how smart you are when the 
[canine] come.” JAY-Z, 99 PROBLEMS (Roc-A-Fella Records, 2003). 
79 See generally Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2–3; Letter 2 from James Lyall, supra 
note 15, at 4–11 (describing several search and seizure incidents at an immigration 
checkpoint without any inquiry into the individual’s citizenship status).  
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III. HOW UNCHECKED DRUG-DOG ALERTS CONTRIBUTE TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE 100-MILE BORDER ZONE 
This section provides a brief overview of CBP’s Canine Program, the 
standards that drug-dogs are held to at immigration checkpoints, and the 
effect on the community. It also provides documented incidents, like that of 
Ms. Josemaria, where drug-dog use further violated individual civil rights at 
immigration checkpoints. 
A. An Overview of the Customs and Border Protection Canine Program 
The CBP Canine Program was established in October 2009.80 The Canine 
Program shares the same broad and ambiguous goals as CBP: “terrorist 
detection and apprehension” and “detection and seizure of controlled 
substances and other contraband.”81 Additionally, with over 1,500 canine 
teams, the CBP Canine Program (Canine Program) is the largest drug-dog 
enforcement unit in the nation.82 The Canine Program trains dogs to identify 
drugs and people,83 and includes programs and training courses such as, 
“Concealed Human and Narcotic Detection,” “Search and Rescue,” 
“Tracking/Trailing,” “Special Response,” “Canine Currency/Firearms 
Detection,” and “Human Remains Detection/Cadaver.” 84  Only limited 
information exists online about the details of the Canine Program. 
                                                                                                       
80 Canine Program History, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, 
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/canine-program/history-3 (last 
visited June 5, 2016). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Fernanda Echevaria, The Sniff Patrol: Border Patrol Dogs Find Drugs, Humans, 
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B. The Deference to Drug-Dogs Supports the Culture of Impunity 
Surrounding the Border Patrol 
Courts generally regard drug-dogs as sufficient indicators of contraband 
and rarely question their reliability, which in effect grants more power to 
handlers, in this case Border Patrol agents. The Ninth Circuit has held that 
once an individual has cleared the initial immigration inspection at a 
checkpoint, an agent cannot extend the length of the detention beyond the 
immigration scope to complete a drug-dog sniff absent a showing of 
“articulable suspicion or a minimal showing of suspicion.” 85  In other 
circuits, courts minimize the need for drug-dog accuracy in search and 
seizure procedures, which in turn may lead to extended stops that may or 
may not be based on suspicion. For example, the Fifth Circuit confusingly 
held that “a showing of a dog’s reliability is not required if probable cause 
is developed on site as a result of a dog sniff of a vehicle,” perpetuating the 
reasoning that the fruits of the search outweigh the legality of the 
procedure.86 Similarly, other circuits have adopted the sweeping idea that a 
drug-dog handler’s testimony under oath regarding the dog’s training and 
certification is sufficient to verify the drug-dog’s reliability.87 In the Sixth 
Circuit, “production of a dog’s performance and training records is not 
                                                                                                       
85 United States v. Preciado-Robles, 964 F.2d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United 
States v. Taylor, 934 F.2d 218, 221 (9th Cir.1991)) (finding that the government’s 
showing that the driver became increasingly nervous during questioning was sufficient to 
establish the requisite suspicion).  
86 United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995).  
87   See United States v. Stevenson, 274 F. Supp. 2d 819, 819 (S.D. Tex. 2002); see, e.g., 
United States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding dog’s reliability 
established by affidavit only stating dog’s training and certification to detect contraband; 
detailed accounting of dog’s track record and education not required); see also United 
States v. Outlaw, 134 F.Supp.2d 807, 814 (W.D. Tex. 2001); United States v. Diaz, 25 
F.3d 392, 395–96 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that the dog’s training and reliability were 
established by the district court’s determination of the handler’s credible testimony as to 
the dog’s training, certification, and experience. “This court has indicated that testimony 
is sufficient to establish a dog’s reliability in order to support a valid sniff.”). 
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necessary to establish a dog’s training and reliability.”88 The reliance on 
drug-dog capabilities and far-reaching extension of power to drug-dog 
handlers fosters the barriers to challenging civil rights violations and 
immunizes the actions of the Border Patrol. 
C. Documented Instances Drug-Dogs Causing or Contributing to Civil 
Rights Violations Within the 100-Mile Border Zone 
The geographic area and communities subject to suspicionless stops and 
questioning by Border Patrol, and the discretion afforded to Border Patrol 
agents, creates greater potential for abuse. The ACLU gathered the 
following examples of unlawful searches and seizures at various 
immigration checkpoints where drug-dogs were involved along the 
southwest border: (1) drug-dogs were used to extend searches despite the 
lack of reasonable suspicion required in roving patrol stops; (2) drug-dogs 
were used at immigration checkpoints to extend searches purely for 
possession of drugs; and (3) drug-dogs were used at immigration 
checkpoints to prolong searches beyond the limited scope of immigration 
questioning.89 
Border Patrol has used drug-dogs to unlawfully extend roving patrol 
stops despite the lack of reasonable suspicion required to justify the seizure 
in the first place. For example, on October 9, 2013, the ACLU filed an 
administrative complaint with the Department of Homeland Security 
requesting investigation of various unlawful roving patrol stops by Border 
Patrol conducted in southern Arizona.90 In one incident, Bryan Barrow, a 
US citizen and resident of Oregon, was returning from a hike when he 
found a park ranger peering into his vehicle.91 Even though Mr. Barrow 
                                                                                                       
88 Stevenson, 274 F.Supp.2d at 822. 
89 Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2. 
90 See Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1, at 1.  
91 Id. at 6. 
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cooperated with the ranger, the ranger interrogated Mr. Barrow regarding 
whether there was marijuana in the vehicle and called in additional rangers 
for assistance.92 Eventually, a Border Patrol agent with a drug-dog arrived 
and began inspecting the vehicle. 93  Mr. Barrow was never asked for 
permission to search his vehicle, and he objected to the search.94 The dog 
never visibly alerted to the vehicle, but the agent alleged that the drug-dog 
was “set off,” thus permitting the agent to initiate the search.95 The dog 
caused significant damage to Mr. Barrow’s vehicle, totaling close to $700 
worth of damage; however, when Mr. Barrow’s insurance company 
submitted for reimbursement, the Border Patrol denied the claim.96 With the 
dog search, the total detention lasted approximately four hours, and the 
Border Patrol found no drugs.97 This case demonstrates an instance where 
the Border Patrol used a drug-dog to conduct general law enforcement 
duties beyond the scope of the Border Patrol: there was no inquiry or 
suspicion related to Mr. Barrow’s immigration status and thus no need to 
contact the Border Patrol, and no drug-dog “alert” was observed by Mr. 
Barrow. The Department of Homeland Security has failed to investigate 
these complaints.98 
In a second administrative complaint against the Department of 
Homeland Security on January 15, 2014, the ACLU sought investigation 
into abuses at interior immigration checkpoints by Border Patrol.99 In that 
complaint, nine out of the twelve documented incidents involved drug-dogs, 
                                                                                                       
92 Id. at 6–7. 





98  E-mail from James Lyall, Staff Attorney, ACLU of Arizona, to Yessenia Medrano 
(Mar. 24, 2015) (on file with author). 
99 Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1.  
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and in eight of the nine incidents, the drug-dog either falsely alerted or the 
Border Patrol agent appeared to direct the drug-dog to alert.100 
In some incidents listed in the January 2014 complaint, Border Patrol 
agents used dogs to prolong detention or to conduct searches for evidence 
of criminal law violations without ever inquiring into individuals’ 
citizenship or immigration status. During a December 18, 2013, incident at 
the well-known Arivaca temporary checkpoint in Amado, Arizona, 
occupants in a vehicle passing through the checkpoint were referred to 
secondary inspection for no apparent reason. 101  A Border Patrol agent 
unlawfully prolonged their detention by making them wait until a drug-dog 
arrived to conduct a search because the occupants declined to consent to a 
search.102 The individuals were detained for 30 minutes, and they were 
never asked about their citizenship status.103  
In another incident, a family was passing through an immigration 
checkpoint east of the Tohono O’odham Reservation in Arizona on August 
19, 2013.104 The family was immediately directed to secondary inspection 
without any questions regarding citizenship or any other explanation 
besides an alleged drug-dog alert.105 However, no drug-dog was nearby 
when the agent claimed that there was an “alert.”106  
One woman reported two incidents were she was detained due to false 
drug-dog alerts while passing through the same checkpoint in Tombstone, 
Arizona, that led to no findings of contraband.107 First, on November 8, 
2012, she was detained for 45 minutes due to an alleged drug-dog “alert.”108 
                                                                                                       
100 Id. at 9–11 (emphasis added). 
101 Id. at 4–5. 
102 Id. at 4–5. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 8. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 10. 
108 Id. at 10. 
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Then, on January 1, 2013, she was referred to secondary inspection after an 
agent walked a drug-dog around her vehicle, tapped on the trunk of her 
vehicle, and said there was a “hit.” 109  The woman’s father is a retired 
sheriff’s deputy who has extensive experience with police dogs and stated 
that he had witnessed improper handling of the dogs at that checkpoint, and 
suspects his daughter was racially profiled due to her possible “Latina” 
appearance.110 
Lastly, one man was referred to secondary inspection on three different 
occasions at checkpoints in Arizona due to alleged dog “alerts.”111 On the 
first occasion, on December 21, 2012, he was directed to a secondary 
inspection based on alleged drug-dog “alert,” and the dog was allowed to 
search the inside of his vehicle despite his objections, destroying some 
business papers in the process. 112  On the second occasion on 
December 28, 2012, he was directed to secondary inspection due to an 
alleged drug-dog “alert,” and he was detained for ten minutes.113 On the 
third occasion on October 24, 2012, he was directed to secondary inspection 
due to a drug-dog “alert,” and while in secondary inspection, the agent 
continued to command the dog to “hit” but nothing was found.114 These 
instances demonstrate the power of inaccurate “alerts” to infringe on 
individuals’ persons, property, and privacy, as well as abuse of authority by 
Border Patrol agents through the use of drug-dogs. 
Furthermore, in some cases, drug-dogs were used to prolong a search 
even though the agents had completed their immigration search, and no 
apparent additional requisite suspicion existed. In an incident on December 
2, 2013, involving the Arivaca checkpoint, an individual was referred to 
                                                                                                       
109 Id. at 10. 
110 Id. at 10 n.20. 
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secondary inspection after the Border Patrol agent had verified his 
citizenship status. 115  At secondary inspection, the Border Patrol agent 
directed the individual to exit the vehicle and directed a drug-dog inside the 
vehicle.116 When the driver of the vehicle objected to the search, the agent 
cursed at him; the individual was detained for 30 minutes.117 
In another incident on November 29, 2013, at a checkpoint between 
California and Arizona, after confirming their US Citizenship, two 
individuals were referred to secondary inspection where they were again 
asked about their citizenship status.118 The individuals were asked to exit 
the vehicle for no apparent reason, and an agent arrived with a drug-dog and 
circled the vehicle. 119  Despite the fact that the drug-dog alerted to the 
vehicle next door, the agent said the dog hit their car and Border Patrol 
needed to conduct a search of the vehicle.120 When the individuals objected, 
they were taken to holding cells where they were detained for 45 minutes 
before being released. 121  Department of Homeland Security has not 
responded to this complaint filed in January 2014.122 
IV. ABUSES AT IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINTS AND OUTDATED 100-
MILE BORDER ZONE JURISPRUDENCE CALLS FOR THE ELIMINATION 
OF DRUG-DOGS AT IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINTS 
Courts, policy makers, and citizens continue to allow an increased 
deference to the Border Patrol in the interest of national security.123 CBP 
                                                                                                       
115 Id. at 6. 
116 Id. at 7. 
117 Id. 




122 E-mail from James Lyall, supra note 98. 
123 See generally U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, VISION AND STRATEGY 2020 
(2015), http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf 
(emphasizing the range of work and tactics of CBP to protect national security). 
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and the Canine Program’s broad and ambiguous goal of “terrorist detection 
and apprehension” provide the Border Patrol with little guidance and 
accountability.124 However, the cost of securing our borders is not without 
civil rights violations. Even if a drug-dog alert is sufficient to establish 
probable cause to search, it does not justify the fact that the liberty of many 
border residents and travelers is rendered nonexistent when they are 
detained for lengthy periods as a result of a false drug-dog alert. In some 
documented roving patrol cases discussed earlier, the requisite reasonable 
suspicion justifying the initial stop conducted by the Border Patrol is 
lacking, making the subsequent drug-dog “alert” and search, whether based 
on probable cause or not, unlawful. 125  In other roving patrol instances, 
detentions are unjustly prolonged beyond the permissible scope because 
individuals are forced to wait for a drug-dog to arrive to conduct a search.126 
As discussed, cases have been documented where the Border Patrol has 
used drug-dogs to allege “alerts” that end up being false.127 Additionally, 
false alerts can “result from conscious and unconscious signals from the 
handler, essentially causing the canine to suspect contraband.”128 An agent 
is unable to determine whether the dog is alerting to drugs or humans, thus 
making it easier for Border Patrol to veil their primary narcotics interdiction 
                                                                                                       
124 Canine Program History, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,  
http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/canine-program/history-3 (last 
visited June 5, 2016).  
125 Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1, at 6.  
126 See Id. at 6–10. 
127 See Jorge G. Aristotelidis, Trained Canines at the U.S.-Mexico Border Region: A 
Review of Current Fifth Circuit Law and a Call for Change, 5 SCHOLAR 227, 239 (2003); 
see also Know Your Rights with Border Patrol, AM. C.L. UNION, 
http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ACLU%20Border%20Rights%20EN
GLISH.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).  
128 See Aristotelidis, supra note 127, at 239; see also Know Your Rights with Border 
Patrol, AM. C.L. UNION, 
http://www.acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/ACLU%20Border%20Rights%20EN
GLISH.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2014); see also Lisa Lit et al., Handler Beliefs Affect 
Scent Detection Dog Outcomes, 14 ANIMAL COGNITION, 387, 387–394 (2011).  
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priority, because a drug-dog only has one physical “alert.”129 Due to the 
potential for false drug-dog alerts and ability of handlers to abuse their 
power and manipulate an “alert,” a drug-dog “alert” should not be sufficient 
to establish probable cause to search. 
A. Arguments For and Against the Canine Program 
The political and social climate in the United States, as well as the 
continued “War on Drugs” and “War on Terror,” may provide policy 
makers and courts with sufficient support for the Canine Program. 130 
Detection and seizure of controlled substances and other contraband131 is a 
goal of the program, and based on available data, the program has been 
successful in interdicting unlawful narcotics in the US. For example,  
from April 2006 through June 2007, US Customs and Border 
Protection had procured 322 untrained canines . . . while only 
3.85% of the Office of Border Patrol’s 13,905 agents were canine 
handlers, they were credited with 60% of narcotic apprehensions 
and 40% of all other apprehensions in [fiscal year] 2007.132 
More recently, in fiscal year 2013, “CBP Canine Teams were responsible 
for apprehending 55,604 [undocumented immigrants], and seizing 403,478 
pounds of narcotics.”133 
                                                                                                       
129 Motion to Reconsider Court’s Tentative Ruling Upholding Stop and Referral to 
Secondary Inspection without Reasonable Suspicion, State of Arizona v. David Frederick 
Wakeling, No. S1400CR2007-00316, (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2008), at 5, 
http://www.k9consultantsofamerica.com/training_information/yuma1.pdf. 
130 Jim Giermanski, DHS, Drug Interdiction and Common Sense, CSO ONLINE (Apr. 3, 
2009), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2123915/compliance/dhs--druginterdiction-and-
common-sense.html. 
131 Id.  
132 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., A REVIEW OF U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION’S PROCUREMENT OF UNTRAINED CANINES 1 (Apr. 2008), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_08-46_Apr08.pdf.  
133 While not specific, this statistic likely includes canines at all immigrant checkpoints. 
Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2013, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
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However, aside from CBP’s ever-increasing budget and the cost 
associated with running the Canine Program,134 communities appear to be 
pushing away from the War on Drugs through legislative reforms.135 For 
example, 18 states have passed forms of legislation decriminalizing 
marijuana,136 the primary drug seized at border checkpoints.137 If marijuana 
use continues to be decriminalized, this could further decrease the narcotics 
smuggling in the southern border region and lessen the need for drug-dogs 
under the national security rationale. Additionally, the fact that drug-dogs 
only have one “alert” 138  is relevant to whether marijuana use is legal 
because drug-dogs cannot distinguish between the type of drug an 
individual is carrying, thus increasing the potential for drug-dog error. To 
address this issue, some local police departments have removed drug-dogs 
from their police work to eliminate the possibility of conducting an illegal 
search.139 Furthermore, because the Border Patrol does not publicly disclose 
its statistics on individual checkpoints, the amount and types of narcotics 
seized at various checkpoints are unknown to the public, even though that 
                                                                                                       
PROTECTION 19 (2013), 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FY%202013%20Final%20PAR_0.pdf. 
134 Motion to Reconsider, supra note 129, at 5.  
135 State Marijuana Laws Map, GOVERNING,  
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2016).  
136 Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See NORML, http://norml.org/states (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2015).   
137 SECTOR PROFILE-FISCAL YEAR 2014, U.S. BORDER PATROL (2014),  
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USBP%20Stats%20FY2014%20sector
%20profile.pdf. 
138 Motion to Reconsider, supra note 129, at 5.  
139 Everton Bailey Jr., Marijuana Sniffing Dogs on Way, OREGON LIVE (Jan. 31, 2015), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2015/01/marijuana-
sniffing_dogs_on_way.html.  
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information could assist in determining which temporary and permanent 
checkpoints are actually “necessary.”140 
Moreover, the statute governing the 100-mile border zone rule and the 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence granting wide search and seizure 
discretion to the Border Patrol are outdated. As the ACLU points out, the 
statute authorizing Border Patrol to conduct immigration checkpoints 
throughout border communities was enacted at a time when there were only 
1,000 Border Patrol agents; 21,000 agents patrol our borders today. 141 
Fourth Amendment precedent is often focused on the act committed rather 
than the private and public interests at stake and fails to take into account 
the impact that those decisions will have on the general public as a result. 
Allowing Border Patrol agents to use drug-dogs to initiate and conduct 
searches and seizures is a grant of additional law enforcement power that 
the Border Patrol is unequipped and untrained to take on, in part because of 
the unreliability of drug-dogs. For example, in Mr. Barrow’s incident 
documented in the October 23, 2013, ACLU administrative complaint, park 
rangers alerted Border Patrol to a situation where no immigration inquiry 
(or criminal) was apparently at issue. 142  This is just one example 
demonstrating the increasing reliance on Border Patrol to execute general 
law enforcement tasks that are outside of their primary function. 
Courts have emphasized that drug-dogs are more likely to be reliable due 
to training, and the sniff does not implicate the privacy concerns involved in 
a search.143 Some have argued that dogs are better at identifying a particular 
                                                                                                       
140 See Ted Robbins, In Arizona, Citizens Keep Close Eye on Immigration Checkpoint, 
NPR (Mar. 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/29/296297733/in-arizona-citizens-
keep-close-eye-on-immigration-checkpoint. 
141 Know Your Rights: The Government’s 100-Mile “Border Zone,” AM. C.L. UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights-governments-100-mile-border-zone-map (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2016).  
142 Letter 1 from James Lyall, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
143 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); see also United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (stating that a “sniff discloses only the presence or absence of 
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odor than current technology.144 Some might also argue that, while drugs 
may be inaccurate at times, they do not possess the same biases humans or 
their handlers do.145 
However, dogs falsely alert due to individual error. For example, in an 
article from 2008, the coordinator for the K-9 unit in the Tucson, Arizona, 
Border Patrol sector said that, “checkpoints are the most difficult 
environment for dogs to work in because of the distractions.”146 At one of 
the busiest checkpoints where at least one dog is on duty all day, “there’s 
wind, distracting odors, agents working around them, other dogs and, of 
course, the 1,500 vehicles that drive by every hour[.]” 147  Additionally, 
working in dry and hot climates such as the Southwest can dry out the 
mucus in the dog’s nose, thus interfering with their accuracy rate.148 Dogs 
enjoy being rewarded and may provide false alerts for the rewards.149 The 
Border Patrol has data indicating false alerts by drug-dogs.150 
Additionally, while Illinois v. Caballes held that a drug-dog sniff at a 
stop was acceptable as long as the sniff was within the scope of the stop, it 
                                                                                                       
narcotics . . . the information obtained is limited,” which “also ensures that the owner of 
the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less 
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods”). 
144 Mark Derr, With Dog Detectives, Mistakes Can Happen, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/24/science/with-dog-detectives-mistakes-can-
happen.html. 
145See U.S. v. Stevenson, 274 F.Supp.2d 824 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (stating that “the use of 
canine inspections cannot be underestimated in today’s diverse society, when all of us-
and particularly those involved in law enforcement-are concerned about ethnic profiling . 
. . canines provide a means of crime detection that is neutral as to race, ethnicity, gender, 
age, nationality and other sensitive variables”). 
146 Fernanda Echavarri, Sniff Patrol: Border Patrol Dogs Find Drugs, Humans, TUCSON 





148 Derr, supra note 144.  
149 Id.  
150 Echavarri, supra note 146. 
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is unclear where the scope of the stop ends or whether a dog is 
unreasonably prolonging the stop due to the lack of finality from the courts 
or regulations defining “reasonable time.”151 Along those lines, allowing a 
dog to search too long in one area may increase errors.152 While mixed 
research exists on whether drug-dogs carry biases towards race or ethnicity, 
their handlers who are ultimately in control may carry those biases.153 Also, 
the fact that courts tend to defer to the drug-dog’s handler to assess 
“reliability” of a drug-dog alert further serves to blur the lines of individual 
rights and protections.154 Thus, keeping a dog stationed in an area or with a 
handler who tends to be more suspicious of people who appear to be 
Latinx155 may pass that bias on to the dogs. 
Questioning the Border Patrol agents’ actions, filing complaints with 
Border Patrol, and pursuing legal remedies are costly and inaccessible. For 
example, while researching the CBP complaint process, I submitted a 
standard test complaint on November 21, 2014, online with the US CBP 
Information Center.156 I did not hear back until June 8, 2015, when I was 
sent the following response: 
Your question was forwarded to the complaints team on 
June 05, 2015 for review. We regret the delay in receiving your 
email from the “Ask a Question” queue. Due to the length of time 
                                                                                                       
151 Mike Riggs, How Long Can a Cop Keep You After a Traffic Stop? No One’s Sure, 
CITYLAB (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/commute/2014/02/how-long-can-cop-
keep-you-pulled-over-after-traffic-stop-no-ones-sure/8293/. 
152 Derr, supra note 144. 
153 See generally Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2; see also Lisa Lit et al., supra note 
128, at 387–94.  
154 Jorge G. Aristotelidis, Trained Canines at the U.S. – Mexico Border Region: A Review 
of Current Fifth Circuit Law and a Call for Change, 5 THE SCHOLAR 236 (2003). 
155 The “x” represents gender neutrality and includes individuals who do not identify 
within the gender binary. 
156 E-mail from Officer Balero, CBP INFO Center, to Yessenia Medrano (June 8, 2015) 
(on file with the author).  
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it has been since you emailed; we are unsure if you still require a 
response. However, if you do, please write us back.157 
In my experience speaking with border residents in the Southwest and 
Washington State, aggressive actions by Border Patrol agents have deterred 
individuals from questioning the Border Patrol agents’ actions and motives, 
thus instilling a culture of fear among border residents and travelers. Some 
data, if documented, such as the amount of drugs interdicted or 
apprehensions at each specific checkpoint, may be available through 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and lawsuits. However, those 
methods usually take time, may be costly, and are inaccessible due to other 
barriers.158 Moreover, even if FOIA requests were filed, no guarantee exists 
that all of the information would be provided due to the lack of reporting 
conducted by CBP and the interest of the government to redact certain 
information.159 
However, in Arivaca, Arizona, where a temporary immigration 
checkpoint has been operating for seven years on a road that does not lead 
to the border,160 the community has taken monitoring of the checkpoint into 
their own hands and has documented unlawful detentions and racial 
discrimination, among other data. 161  With the demonstrated lack of 
accountability and culture of impunity, there is little incentive to file 
complaints online due to fear of immigration enforcement, among other 
consequences.162 
                                                                                                       
157 Id. 
158 Such as, lack of access to resources and lack of knowledge of individual rights within 
the border zone. 
159 See generally Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 4, 11. CBP refused to turn over all info 
and most of it was redacted. 
160 Ted Robbins, In Arizona, Citizens Keep Close Eye on Immigration Checkpoint, NPR 
(Mar. 29, 2014, 4:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/29/296297733/in-arizona-
citizens-keep-close-eye-on-immigration-checkpoint. 
161 Id. 
162 Daniel E. Martínez et al., No Action Taken: Lack of CBP Accountability in 
Responding to Complaints of Abuse, AM. IMMIGR. COUNS. (May 4, 2014), 
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Furthermore, there are limited free or low-cost legal services in many 
border communities,163 thus legal services organizations must be strategic in 
the battles they choose to pursue. A canine search of a vehicle can cause 
property damage and be a completely traumatizing experience, especially to 
particularly vulnerable populations such as small children, people with 
disabilities, and people with allergies.164 Yet, the damages available may 
not be worth the trouble of filing a legal complaint. 165  Government 
resources should be allotted to helping border residents pursue those 
monetary damages even if they are minimal to provide some accountability 
to the victims of border patrol abuses; justice is not always defined by the 
amount of money that will be won. What may seem like a small amount of 
money to remedy violations of civil rights is relative, and this sort of cost-
benefit analysis demonstrates how we continue to marginalize members of 
our communities due to economic status. 
V. WAYS THE GOVERNMENT, THE COURTS, LEGAL ADVOCATES, 
AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS CAN TAKE ACTION TO DECREASE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ABUSES IN BORDER REGIONS 
In order to deter abuses and reacquire border community rights, I 
recommend that either CBP or Congress eliminate the use of drug-dogs at 
interior immigration checkpoints. Removing drug-dogs would help deter 
inaccurate and unlawful searches and seizures by the Border Patrol, and 
possibly place greater demand on CBP to properly train Border Patrol 
                                                                                                       
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/no-action-taken-lack-cbp-
accountability-responding-complaints-abuse. 
163 Directory of Pro Bono Programs, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
https://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/probono/directory.html# (last visited Mar. 5, 
2016).  
164 See Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2, 5, 23.   
165 Radley Balko, Federal Appeals Court: Drug dog That’s Barely More Accurate than a 
Coin Flip is Good Enough,  WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/08/04/federal-appeals-court-
drug-dog-thats-barely-more-accurate-than-a-coin-flip-is-good-enough/.  
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agents on the law if they are unable to be as reliant on drug-dogs. The 
following programs could be implemented to help limit civil rights abuses 
at the border:  
(1) Customs and Border Protection can voluntarily end the Canine 
Program within the 100-mile border zone;  
(2) Courts can shift their focus towards decisions that protect civil 
rights, rather than diminishing them, by recognizing the US 
population’s decreased desire to criminalize drugs and the reality 
of the immensely intrusive nature of drug-dog sniffs and searches;  
(3) Congress can pass a law prohibiting the use of drug-dogs at 
interior immigration checkpoints;  
(4) The US Government can redefine what “a reasonable distance” 
from the border means under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) to scale the 
100-mile border zone regulations back and limit the Border 
Patrol’s authority;  
(5) The US Government can increase funding to legal advocates 
primarily in border communities to focus on border civil rights 
issues; and  
(6) Community members can continue organizing checkpoint 
monitoring systems to document the Border Patrol’s activities and 
pressure the Border Patrol to comply with the law at immigration 
checkpoints. 
 First, CBP could voluntarily eliminate the Canine Program at internal 
immigration checkpoints to align more with the primary permissible source 
of authority governing immigration checkpoints—immigration 
enforcement. However, this solution is highly unlikely, given CBP’s goals, 
boasting apprehension and unlawful drug interdiction data, and their 
annually increasing budget. 166  In the alternative, CBP can take steps to 
                                                                                                       
166 See generally FY 2015 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY (July 2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/about-
content/fy2015_summary.pdf (highlighting CBP’s budget increases and performance).  
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accurately report activities occurring at checkpoints and be more transparent 
about that data. For example, CBP can start by disclosing the total number 
and location of interior permanent and temporary immigration checkpoints, 
including the number of staff and drug-dogs at each checkpoint, and the 
hours of operation. As of 2014, CBP failed to report the total number of 
checkpoints operating within the 100-mile border zone, only acknowledging 
35 permanent checkpoints while maintaining the capacity for 200.167 Legal 
services organizations have had to resort to costly and time-consuming 
litigation to collect other basic information.168A culture of transparency 
among the Border Patrol could help foster a culture of trust among residents 
in border communities. 
Second, courts can play a more active role in restoring the civil rights of 
the Fourth Amendment that they have consistently whittled down 
throughout case law. No drug exception exists in the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.169 Yet courts have 
continued to embrace a lower regard for civil rights closer to the border—
the Supreme Court went as far as authorizing to use of perceived 
“Hispanic” race or ethnicity to determine whether reasonable suspicion 
exists for the Border Patrol to conduct a roving patrol stop.170 
While, dissents from precedential Fourth Amendment cases provide an 
extensive summary and critique on how the US Supreme Court has 
advocated for the government in the War on Drugs and now the War on 
                                                                                                       
167 Patrol Checkpoints Stir Public Backlash, USA TODAY (June 7, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/06/07/border-patrol-checkpoints-stir-
public-backlash/10113693/. 
168 See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ariz., Residents of Arivaca, 
Ariz. Sue Border Patrol Over Right to Protest Checkpoint Operations (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.acluaz.org/issues/press-releases/2014-11/4961.  
169 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 31, 47–48 (2000). 
170 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975); but see United States 
v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that in the Ninth 
Circuit, Hispanic appearance is an impermissive factor to rely on to develop a reasonable 
suspicion to conduct a stop).  
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Terror,171 state courts and state legislators have greater flexibility to be more 
protective of individual rights and states. Community members should 
organize to advocate for greater rights under state constitutions. For 
example, while the US Supreme Court held that pretext stops were 
acceptable in Whren v. United States, the Washington State Supreme Court 
in State v. Ladson held that pretext stops violated Article I, Section 7 of the 
Washington State Constitution.172 State courts and legislators can empower 
the community by creating law that protects individual rights rather than 
justifying the intrusions of rights by federal agents. 
States and circuit courts set different standards that govern the rights of 
individuals in those jurisdictions against Border Patrol, which may 
contribute to the misinformation both on the part of residents and the 
Border Patrol about individual rights in those regions. Border communities 
could benefit from case law that provides clearer, but more protective, laws. 
As Justice Jackson stated in his dissenting opinion in Brinegar v. United 
States, 
These [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not mere second-
class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. 
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a 
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror 
in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first 
and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary 
government.173 
                                                                                                       
171 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567–78 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (providing an extensive list of cases through from 1975–1976 whose holdings 
continuously weakened “Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches 
and seizures”). 
172 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 
1999).  
173 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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Courts need to change their reasonableness balancing analysis to account 
for (1) the US public’s increasing interest in decriminalization of drugs,174 
and (2) the real intrusive and discriminatory nature of drug-dogs at 
immigration checkpoints.175 
Third, Congress could pass a law prohibiting the use of drug-dogs at 
interior immigration checkpoints. As demonstrated by documented 
complaints, civil rights violations in border communities due to the use of 
drug-dogs exist, but do not receive the media coverage or national 
attention.176 Furthermore, many documented civil rights violations suggest 
that the Border Patrol is abusing its power at immigration checkpoints to 
focus its efforts on unlawful drug interdiction.177 Marijuana is the largest 
drug seized at border checkpoints,178 yet it is a drug that is becoming more 
commonly accepted for medicinal and recreational purposes across the 
nation.179 The increasing legalization of marijuana has even inspired some 
local police departments to remove drug-dogs from their police work to 
eliminate the possibility of an unlawful search.180 These factors combined 
                                                                                                       
174 See generally DRUG POLICE ALLIANCE, APPROACHES TO DECRIMINALIZING DRUG 
USE AND POSSESSION 3–4 (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016//Contributions/Civil/DrugPolicyAlliance/
DPA_Fact_Sheet_Approaches_to_Decriminalization_Feb2015_1.pdf; see also Taking 
Control: Pathways to Drug Policies that Work, GLOBAL COMM’N ON DRUG POLICY 
(Sept. 2014), http://www.gcdpsummary2014.com/#foreword-from-the-chair. 
175 See generally Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2–3.  
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 3; see also Andrew Becker, Four of Five Border Patrol Drug Busts Involve U.S. 
Citizens, Records Show, THE CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://cironline.org/reports/four-five-border-patrol-drug-busts-involve-us-citizens-
records-show-4312; About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, 
http://www.cbp.gov/about (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
178 U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2014, 100–01 (2014), 
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP_DHS_2014%20PAR_508C.PDF. 
179 See, e.g., Chris Boyette & Jacque Wilson, It’s 2015: Is Weed Legal in Your State?, 
CNN (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/07/us/recreational-marijuana-laws/. 
180 Bailey, supra note 139.   
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should persuade elected officials that drug-dogs at immigration checkpoints 
are problematic and the elimination of their use within the 100-mile border 
zone would help prevent some border civil rights violations. 
Because border regions are particularly affected by the use of drug-dogs 
at immigration checkpoints, elected officials in those areas could consider 
leading the way in a call to action on the civil rights abuses occurring in 
their communities. Northern border communities like those in Washington 
State may be likelier leaders in the reform on drug-dog use by the Border 
Patrol because of their generally progressive culture,181 and greater amount 
of legal services they can devote to litigating issues with the Border 
Patrol.182 Furthermore, Washington State has legalized the recreational and 
medicinal use of marijuana, and because the Border Patrol has expanded 
throughout the US since September 11, 2001, parts of Washington State 
within the 100-mile border zone are not immune to civil rights violations 
caused by drug-dogs and the Border Patrol.183 
Fourth, the regulations authorizing the scope and breadth of the 100-mile 
border zone can be reexamined and narrowed. Again, the regulations 
establishing the 100-mile border zone were created in the 1950s, at a time 
when approximately 1,100 Border Patrol agents policed our borders; today, 
over 21,000 Border Patrol agents patrol the 100-mile border zone.184 Today, 
                                                                                                       
181 Peter Mountford, Pacific Northwest: Bicycles, Bookshops, Weirdness & Coffee, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 24, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2013/may/25/pacific-
northwest-seattle-oregon-coffee. 
182 See, e.g., Settlement Reins in Border Patrol Stops on the Olympic Peninsula, AM. C.L. 
UNION (Sept. 24, 2013), https://aclu-wa.org/news/settlement-reins-border-patrol-stops-
olympic-peninsula. 
183 See generally FRED T. KOREMATSU CENTER FOR LAW AND EQUALITY ET. AL.,  




184 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a)(2); see also The Constitution in the 
100-Mile Border Zone, AM. C.L. UNION, www.aclu.org/constitution-100-mile-border-
zone (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
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approximately two-thirds of the US population lives within the jurisdiction 
of the Border Patrol.185 The United States has gone through political and 
social change since the 1950s, and border communities have increased in 
size;186 we are living in different times. Even if the government is not ready 
to eliminate drug-dogs from immigration checkpoints, we should at the very 
least seriously scale back the 100-mile border zone to prevent various civil 
rights abuses.187 
Fifth, the US government should increase funding for legal services 
organizations to provide an equal and just opportunity to legally advocate 
for the civil rights of border communities. Legal resources in border 
communities with the greatest amount of Border Patrol agents are severely 
underfunded and understaffed. In a nation that values human rights, dignity, 
and autonomy, individuals who have suffered injustice at the hands of the 
Border Patrol should be heard, and the government should support the work 
of legal advocates and the rights of border communities.188 Furthermore, if 
advocates receive more support from the government, they may be in a 
better position to help share knowledge, such as “know your rights” 
trainings, in their communities to prevent future abuses and support 
individuals in reporting past and ongoing abuses. 
                                                                                                       
185 Id.; see also Factsheet on Customs and Border Protection’s 100-Mile Zone, AM. C.L. 
UNION, http://www.aclu.org/technology- and-liberty/fact-sheet-us-constitution-free-
zone (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
186 The Constitution in the 100-Mile Border Zone, AM. C.L. UNION, 
www.aclu.org/constitution-100-mile-border-zone (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). 
187 The ACLU proposes that the 100-mile border zone allowing Border Patrol broad 
authority should be scaled back to 25-miles. Custom and Border Protection’s (CBP’s) 
100-Mile Rule, AM. C.L. UNION, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/13_08_01_aclu_100_mile_cbp_zone_final.
pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).  
188 See, e.g., Steve O’Ban & Cyrus Habib, Justice For All, Not Only For Those Who Can 
Afford It, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 18, 2015), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/protecting-the-legal-rights-of-the-poor/. 
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Additionally, with more resources, advocates can focus on impact 
litigation around civil rights. The administrative complaint data produced 
by the ACLU is only a sample of Fourth Amendment violations occurring 
in border communities as a result of the use of drug-dogs. Additionally, the 
Department of Homeland Security has not taken action to investigate these 
abuses.189 Legal advocates could consider filing a class action lawsuit on 
behalf of border residents subject to regular checkpoints and ongoing abuse 
in their communities.190 Such litigation could be a vehicle for courts to 
uphold individual right sunder the Fourth Amendment. 
Sixth, while time and resources are always barriers, border residents can 
borrow the community accountability model used at the Arivaca checkpoint 
to hold the Border Patrol in their communities accountable. As discussed 
above, community members in Arivaca began monitoring the Border Patrol 
checkpoint in their area after the Border Patrol was nonresponsive to their 
original complaints of traffic disruption, discrimination, harassment, and 
lack of transparency. Legal advocates should collaborate with community 
members to ensure that community members are equipped with the proper 
legal tools to advocate on their own behalf in case the Border Patrol is 
resistant, which it has been at Arivaca.191 
VI. CONCLUSION: DOGS ARE FRIENDS, NOT FEDERAL AGENTS 
This article is limited to the elimination of drug-dogs at checkpoints 
within the 100-mile border zone. Legal professionals with power and 
privilege should all be contributing to a discussion on Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                       
189 E-mail from James Lyall, supra note 98. 
190 Bob Ortega, Border Patrol Sued for Harassing at Arivaca Checkpoint, AZCENTRAL 
(Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2014/11/20/border-patrol-
aclu-lawsuit-arivaca-checkpoint-harassment/70021978/. 
191 Ted Robbins, In Arizona, Citizens Keep Close Eye on Immigration Checkpoint, NPR 
(Mar. 29, 2014, 4:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/29/296297733/in-arizona-
citizens-keep-close-eye-on-immigration-checkpoint. 
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policy and its impact in border regions. We must be critical of the 100-mile 
border zone regulation, which is outdated and never underwent a formal 
administrative process, and our search and seizure laws, which in large part 
have been defined by the US government’s interest in interdicting 
marijuana activities and supporting the “War on Drugs.” Regardless of the 
motivation behind creating such sweeping regulations, these laws are 
overbroad and ambiguous. They pay little attention to the individuals 
residing in these communities, migration patterns, to the authority and lack 
of accountability of the Border Patrol, and to other factors such as the 
growing public acceptance towards legalizing federally illegal narcotics. 192 
Removing drug-dogs from interior checkpoints is one step towards 
preventing civil rights violations and demilitarizing the border. While the 
Court has carved out broad exceptions to allow the Border Patrol discretion 
in checkpoint searches, the Border Patrol should not view these exceptions 
as an unlimited grant of authority or an opportunity to trample civil rights. 
Furthermore, the government and courts should be more proactive about 
protecting the civil rights of the border communities. The government needs 
to take accountability for civil rights violations, and courts and legislatures 
need to listen to the affected communities. 
                                                                                                       
192 See Record of Abuse, supra note 9, at 2. 
